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How has the concept of metacognition been used within basic and applied 
psychological research? We begin our answer by presenting a broad definition of 
metacognition, an historical overview of its development and its presence in research 
databases. To assess which function and facets are most frequently addressed within each of 
the sub-disciplines, we present results from separate literature searches. We then review how 
metacognition has been defined and empirically explored within selected sub-disciplines in 
terms of typical research questions, conceptual definitions, how the concept has been 
measured, and examples of interesting findings and implications. We identify similarities, 
inconsistencies, and disagreements across fields and point out areas for future research. Our 
overall conclusion is that it is useful to consider metacognition as a broad umbrella concept 
across different domains and across basic and applied research. Nonetheless, we recommend 
that researchers be more specific and explicit about their approach and assumptions whenever 
using metacognition in their research. 
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Metacognition in psychology  
A general introduction to metacognition 
We just cannot help it. As we think, speak, argue, solve problems, or simply search for 
the right words in a conversation - we constantly monitor our own thinking. We evaluate it, 
we judge it, we sometimes even try to influence it. Only rarely do we rest in the present 
moment without engaging in metacognition - in «thoughts about one’s own thoughts and 
cognitions» (Flavell, 1979). Sometimes we think about our own thinking because we 
intentionally choose to do so. However, most of the time metacognition happens largely 
automatically and involuntarily, so that we remain largely unaware of its presence. 
The obvious benefit of being able to reflect upon one’s own thinking is that it allows 
us to take control over our cognitive activity. Most researchers therefore agree that 
metacognition has at least two functions. One function is to monitor the current state of 
whatever cognitive activity we are engaged in (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). For instance, 
how well do we understand the text we are currently reading? Or, in the case where we are 
trying to remember something, to what extent do we think we will be able to succeed? The 
other function is to control our own cognition –  to try harder or less hard to remember 
something, or to shift to a different strategy when we are stuck in attempting to solve a 
puzzle. Monitoring and control are closely intertwined: Whether or not we engage in 
metacognitive control, and the ways in which we try to regulate our cognition, will often 
depend on the outcome of metacognitive monitoring. Similarly, monitoring would be of little 
use if it could not elicit control attempts when necessary. 
If metacognition is both about the way we monitor and control our own thinking, it 
covers a wide range of phenomena, including both introspective and self-regulatory 
processes. This is why some researchers have tried to identify distinguishable subcomponents 
of metacognition. A classic distinction (Efklides, 2008, 2011; Flavell, 1979) is between three 
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facets of metacognition: knowledge, strategies, and experiences. Metacognitive knowledge 
(Flavell, 1979) is the person’s knowledge and understanding of their own and other people’s 
cognitive abilities and strategies. For instance, most of us have found out from experience that 
repeating a phone number to ourselves multiple times increases the likelihood of future recall. 
Metacognitive strategies refer to the way in which we deliberately engage in various activities 
to control cognition (Efklides, 2008). An example would be to read a text more slowly if felt 
comprehension is low, or postponing the reading when too tired. Metacognitive experiences 
are feelings and judgements that occur during a cognitive activity and reflects aspects of this 
activity. For example, whilst solving a puzzle, one may experience a feeling of being close to 
or far away from the correct solution. Hence, metacognition ranges from knowledge about 
cognition and what could be regarded as higher order thinking skills (i.e., knowledge) and 
feeling states (i.e., experience), to regulation of cognition (i.e., strategies). (Flavell also 
introduced a fourth facet, namely metacognitive goals (or tasks). This refers to the objective 
of the cognitive activity in question. However, this facet has received less attention than the 
three others.) Importantly, Flavell (1979) emphasized the importance of possible interactions 
between the three facets. For example, metacognitive knowledge may concern which 
metacognitive skills are useful or not for a certain person conducting a certain cognitive task.  
The concept of metacognition has been used to explore a variety of phenomena, from 
the study of the evolution of metacognition to self-regulated learning in school children. It has 
also been used to understand the development and treatment of various forms of 
psychopathology. However, what is still missing is a cross-disciplinary overview which 
points to similarities and differences in how metacognition is understood, as well as to 
methodological differences in how it is explored. This paper aims to give such an overview. 
Through this, we hope to provide those who are new to the field with an introduction to the 
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various ways in which metacognition is defined and measured, and to identify questions over 
which research fields agree as well as disagree.  
We first provide a short historical perspective before we, in the second part, turn to 
how metacognition has been defined more specifically within selected sub-disciplines of 
psychology. For each of the sub-disciplines, we present key questions in the area, how 
metacognition is uniquely defined, and how it is measured. For each of these we also present 
some research findings, and point to their theoretical and applied impact. 
The reader should be aware that due to the extensive amount of research within each 
of the psychological domains we have set out to cover, we are not able to provide a broad 
overview of each area. All that can be done within the limits of this review paper, is to touch 
upon some general trends and exemplify some theoretical and methodological approaches 
within each domain. 
A historical perspective on metacognition  
Metacognition as the act of “thinking about thinking” is as old as the human ability to 
reflect on their own cognitive experiences – what Socrates summarized as “I know what I do 
not know” (Plato, Apology). Ever since the advent of psychology as an independent science at 
the end of the 19th century, aspects of metacognition have been an integral part of it under 
many different names, including “vigorous thinking” (Gray, 1925). In memory research, for 
example, the feeling-of-knowing (FOK) experience (Hart & Kuhlen, 1965) and tip-of-the 
tongue (TOT) state (R. Brown & McNeill, 1966) were studied before the term metacognition 
was established. Metacognition became a hot topic, especially in cognitive and developmental 
psychology, after Flavell outlined a framework to distinguish between the three aspects of 
metacognition introduced above (Flavell, 1979; Flavell & Wellman, 1977). A. L. Brown 
(1977) applied and extended metacognition as being more than an epiphenomenon to 
educational psychology. Her studies on reading comprehension in typically developing as 
Metacognition in psychology 
 
6 
well as children with varying degrees of intellectual ability and challenge, fall into 
developmental, educational, social and clinical psychology. 
Whereas the focus in the 1970s was largely on metacognitive knowledge and 
experience, the focus shifted in the late seventies and eighties to a stronger emphasis on 
metacognitive control and strategy use (Dimmitt & McCormick, 2012). Since then, 
metacognition continued to be a topic of interest in cognitive psychology, especially in 
metamemory research. In clinical psychology, the importance of self-monitoring skills can be 
traced back at least to Ellis (1962), when therapists were encouraged to instruct the patient to 
monitor their cognition, and has since been more formalized by Meyers, Mercatoris, and Artz 
(1976). In comparative psychology, an early study of metacognition in non-human animals 
was conducted by Smith et al. (1995). This was a perceptual discrimination task with dolphins 
but which, as will be discussed later, raised some controversy over the extent to which this 
really was a case of metacognition. Around the same time, metacognition became a topic of 
study in cognitive neuroscience and clinical neurophysiology.  
It should also be noted that a number of early studies of learning addressed 
phenomena that are arguably metacognitive in nature, even though they were not explicitly 
categorized as such. Examples include Harlow's "learning sets" (Harlow, 1949), learned 
helplessness (Seligman & Maier, 1967), and causal inferences in pigeons (Killeen, 1978). 
Some decades later, Reder (1996) reviewed papers on metacognition from multiple 
research fields, including developmental psychology, neuropsychology, and educational 
psychology. She pointed to the fact that the different fields treated metacognition as a concept 
involving some degree of awareness of mental activity, but that the discrepancies between the 
various conceptualizations were of such magnitude that it was difficult to conclude that 
metacognition could be seen as a unitary concept. 
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A database perspective on metacognition 
In the PsycINFO database today, almost 7 000 records are labelled with the 
‘Metacognition/’ term from the Thesaurus of Psychological Index Terms (American 
Psychological Association, n.d.-b; we searched PsycINFO on Ovid, February 11 th, 2019 and 
August 7th, 2019). To get a rough sense of the extent to which metacognition is studied across 
the various sub-disciplines of psychology, we plotted the number of metacognition records 
against each of the most general PsycINFO Classification Codes (American Psychological 
Association, n.d.-a). The results are displayed in Figure 1. 
Most notable, but not surprising, is that metacognition seems to be most frequently 
studied in the sub-disciplines of educational psychology and human experimental psychology 
(including, as its largest subclass, cognitive psychology). Next, a substantial proportion of 
metacognition studies belong to clinical psychology (cc’s 3300 and 3200) and developmental 
psychology. While these four disciplines clearly account for the majority of metacognition 
records, metacognition is dealt with in a handful of other sub-disciplines too. It should be 
noted that two areas that have few citations in PsycINFO (although each above 100), namely 
animal psychology and neuroscience (i.e., "animal experimental & comparative" and 
"physiological psychology & neuroscience") seem to be represented with a larger number of 
citations when other databases are searched (e.g., Scopus, PubMed). 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Based in part on this distribution, and in part on our own interests and areas of 
expertise, the remainder of this paper is organized into subsections from seven sub-
disciplines. The selection criteria were that each sub-discipline should have more than 100 
citations and that the sub-disciplines should also be complementary in terms of the 
content/perspective they represent. Thus, we chose the sub-disciplines of developmental 
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psychology, cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, educational psychology, 
personality and social psychology, clinical psychology, and animal/comparative psychology.  
To assess the function and facets within each of the sub-disciplines we extracted the 
number of records that mentioned metacognition and either knowledge, strategy*, 
experience*, monitor*, or control* in the title, abstract, subject headings or key concepts. We 
then expressed those occurrences relative to the total metacognition records. Figure 2 (upper) 
shows that over one-third of the articles in experimental cognitive psychology, educational 
psychology, and personality and social psychology deal with control aspects of 
metacognition. Control, more than monitoring, is more commonly studied across all 
disciplines. The sub-disciplines also vary in profile when it comes to how the three facets are 
investigated (see Figure 2, lower). In neurosciences and animal psychology, research is most 
often concerned with knowledge, followed by strategy, and with the least focus on 
experience. Developmental and educational psychology have the reverse profile. In these 
disciplines, the facet most often referred to is metacognitive experiences, followed by 
strategy, and then knowledge. In cognitive psychology, most research is concerned with 
metacognitive strategy. In clinical and personality/social psychology, the distribution of 
articles is fairly even across the three facets, but with slightly more on metacognitive strategy 
over the two other facets. 
 [Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Metacognition as it is used in different fields 
 We now present brief introductions to how metacognition has been addressed in each 
of the chosen sub-disciplines. The introductions are meant as examples, and not as 
comprehensive overviews of all relevant research in the sub-disciplines. The distinctions 
between the chosen sub-disciplines are not absolute, and in some cases examples of research 
or methodology could perhaps equally well be placed under a different heading. As is evident 
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from the review, the different domains have also inspired each other, for example, by how 
paradigms from developmental and animal psychology are also used in studies of the 
neuroscience of metacognition. 
 
Developmental Psychology 
Central Questions. The developmental perspective asks when we first see evidence 
of metacognition, how it manifests itself across the lifespan, and which metacognitive 
milestones are typical during various phases of life (Brinck & Liljenfors, 2013; Sodian, 
Thoermer, Kristen, & Perst, 2012). Key questions in developmental psychology have 
therefore been (1) when do we begin thinking metacognitively, (2) practically speaking, how 
do we think metacognitively in relation to particular tasks and how does that influence our 
functioning, (3) does metacognition change across the lifespan, and (4) how can we measure 
these aspects of metacognition (Beran, Brandl, Perner, & Proust, 2012; Hertzog, 2016)? 
Definition. The historical origin of research on metacognition in developmental 
psychology is Flavell’s (1979) distinction between metacognitive knowledge, experience and 
strategies (Schneider, 2008).   
One branch of developmental psychology research has focused on the degree to which 
metacognition is a pre-conscious, pre-reflective, non-representational or preverbal form of 
thinking. Insights from this research help determine when we begin thinking metacognitively 
in early childhood, perhaps even as early as infancy (Brandl, 2012; Brinck & Liljenfors, 2013; 
Kloo & Rohwer, 2012; Sodian et al., 2012).  
  A second branch in the developmental literature turns from that we can think 
metacognitively to how we think metacognitively and act proactively in relation to managing 
important tasks, like education and learning (Zimmerman, 2008).  
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A third branch in development psychology explores how metacognitive abilities 
evolve across the lifespan and particularly whether thinking about how metacognitive skills 
might decline with age as adults mark changes in cognitive fluency and cognitive processing 
time (Hertzog, 2016). However, since older adults can outperform younger adults on some 
metacognitive tasks and are able to adapt or learn metacognitive skills when needed 
(Pennequin, Sorel & Mainguy, 2010), the question as to whether decline more a 
developmental or learning matter remains unclear (Castel, Middlebrooks, & McGillivray, 
2016; Hertzog, 2016). 
Measurement.  First, the focus on children in developmental research has inspired 
methods that are more task-oriented or observational with the idea that metacognitive activity 
becomes evident through how well people perform on tasks that require metacognition 
(Schneider, 2008). Of interest is then that we can think metacognitively from a very early age, 
and do so in varying ways throughout the lifespan (Palmer, David & Fleming, 2014). 
Measures of growing awareness of cognition and the ability to monitor and regulate 
thought – essentially early measures of metacognitive experience – have been captured 
already at ages 2-4 months through observations of intersubjectivity (Brandl, 2012; Brinck & 
Liljenfors, 2013).  
With preschoolers, pretense has been studied through observations of play (Esken, 
2012), testing violations of expectations (Sodian et al., 2012), the nature of false beliefs, i.e. 
understanding that others have a more naïve knowledge than oneself and that they will act 
differently than we would (see Wellman et al., 2001 for a meta-analytical review), 
appearance-reality, i.e., understanding that something may be different from what it appears 
to be, level 2 perspective taking, i.e., understanding that the way something looks to me might 
be different than it looks to you who is looking at it from another angle, and through 
appropriate predictions about and responses to others’ desires and emotions (Flavell, 2004).  
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In middle childhood and beyond, metacognitive studies focus more on measures of 
children’s understanding that knowledge is malleable – active, interpretive and constructive 
(Flavell, 2004). 
 Second, to capture metacognition in older children and adults, self-report inventories 
have been used to measure metacognitive aspects of self-regulation related to metacognitive 
knowledge and skills (Mecacci & Righi, 2006; Schneider, 2008). Of interest is then how we 
think metacognitively in relation to particular tasks, and whether metacognition is domain or 
task specific (see also Cognitive Neuroscience section).  In adult research, tasks that capture 
judgements of learning (JOL) and feelings of knowing (FOL) managing tip-of-the-tong 
(TOT) states with tasks as varied as managing math calculations and reporting metacognitive 
beliefs have also been used (Castel, Middlebrooks, & McGillivray, 2016; Mecacci & Righi, 
2006). 
  Other methods have been developed since in order to complement self-report data 
(Zimmerman, 2008). Those include, for example, the use of monitoring traces of activity in 
computer-assisted learning environments, using think-aloud protocols in a hypermedia 
environment, structured online diaries that measure thinking before and after learning events 
in response to event questions directly related to student study sessions, and classroom 
observations in primary schools. 
Findings and implications. Understanding where people of any age are at 
metacognitively can provide clues for how to tailor care and teaching to their needs, and 
facilitate self-regulated learning. Understanding what kinds of new cognitive realities need 
particular metacognitive attention is important for how we facilitate everyday life in all 
populations, including among older adults who report greater concern about their 
meatcognitive abilities than others (Mecacci & Righi, 2006). 
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 When examining how metacognition develops in infants and preschoolers, for 
example, major growth occurs in terms of how well infants understand, through interactions 
with their caregivers, that actions are intentional and goal-directed. Infants also grow notably 
in how well they manage intentional focus and referential intent (Flavell, 2004). Through 
their preschool years, children metacognitively grow in their understanding of others’ 
attentional focus, desires, emotions, knowledge and beliefs, role in pretense and thinking. 
From there on, children pass several metacognitive milestones that can influence their 
readiness for learning. 
 Between kindergarten and sixth grade, major growth occurs in strategy knowledge, 
while metamemory growth develops much slower into adolescence and beyond (Schneider, 
2008). Metacognitive judgement grows even slower, often in cue-dependent ways. Younger 
children often overestimate how easy it will be for them to perform a new task yet improve in 
this area considerably by early elementary school. Skill at judging what they have learned 
(JOL) and feelings of knowing (FOK) both increase, though little, during elementary school. 
Likewise, when youth are asked to identify task difficulty and allocate study time thereafter, 
all elementary school children are able to distinguish easy from hard tasks, but only the older 
elementary children begin allocating more learning time to the harder tasks than the easier 
tasks. 
During adulthood both objective task performance and metacognitive efficiency (as 
measured by meta-d’) are high. Some report a decline of metacognitive efficiency with age 
(Palmer, David, Fleming, 2014) whereas others have not found notably reduced 
metacognition in older adults (Mitchell, Cam-CAN, and Cusack, 2018).  For older who do 
experience decline, however, compensatory metacognitive control and monitoring strategies 
are important (Hertzog, 2016). 
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Cognitive psychology  
 Central Questions. Koriat (2007) has formulated five categories of questions that 
experimental cognitive psychology on metacognition has addressed, and which represent a 
good summary. These questions concern (1) the bases of metacognitive judgements during 
monitoring of cognitive activity, (2) the validity of such judgements and the variables that 
influence this validity, (3) the processes that influence their accuracy or inaccuracy, (4) how 
metacognitive control is influenced by the output of metacognitive monitoring, and (5) how 
performance is influenced by metacognitive monitoring and control (Koriat, 2007, p. 289). In 
addition, one might add that the inclusion of metacognitive ratings in experimental studies of 
consciousness has been used to infer the conscious status of the knowledge or process in 
question. 
Definition. Metacognition is understood as "cognition about cognition", and is most 
often operationalized in terms of online ratings of varieties of metacognitive experiences, 
depending on the cognitive process in focus, e.g. confidence ratings. A central distinction here 
is between so-called information-based versus experience-based metacognitive feelings 
(Koriat, 2007). A metacognitive feeling that is influenced by the person’s conscious beliefs, 
knowledge or past experiences, is said to be "information-based". For instance, when asked to 
estimate your confidence in the correctness of a decision, confidence may be influenced by 
estimates of skills in the particular domain. On the other hand, it may also be influenced by 
non-conscious factors, such as how quickly your answer came to mind, or the familiarity of 
the task domain. Metacognitive feelings that are influenced by such factors, are referred to as 
"experience-based". Thus, according to this perspective, metacognitive feelings can reflect 
both explicit/conscious and implicit/unconscious cognitive activity. Nevertheless, higher-
order theories of consciousness would argue that the metacognitive state itself is conscious in 
Metacognition in psychology 
 
14 
both cases, because metacognition involves higher-order mental representations which are 
indicative of consciousness (e.g., Rosenthal, 2000). 
 Measurement. Metacognition is most often measured by the use of introspective self-
reports collected during a cognitive task – so-called “online” measures. The classic example is 
feelings of knowing (FOK) in memory situations (Hart & Kuhlen, 1965; Koriat & Levy-
Sadot, 2001; Metcalfe, Schwartz, Joaquim, & Rayner, 1993). Here, the felt likelihood of 
future memory for unrecalled items is compared to actual later recognition accuracy for those 
items. Another classic example is tip-of-the tongue (TOT) ratings (Schwartz, 1999), in which 
the feeling of future recall is stronger and more imminent. Again, subjective ratings are 
compared to objective memory accuracy. In learning situations, metacognition has been 
measured with judgements of learning (JOL) (Schwartz, 1994). Within problem solving, the 
classic example of metacognition is warmth ratings. Metcalfe and Wiebe (1987) demonstrated 
how the relationship between warmth ratings and closeness to the correct solution differed for 
insight versus non-insight problem solving. This was used to argue that the underlying 
cognitive processes were different. Similarly, the degree of correspondence between 
confidence ratings and classification accuracy has been used to argue whether knowledge 
acquired in so-called implicit learning situations, is conscious or unconscious (Norman & 
Price, 2015). 
 Other ratings of metacognition in cognitive psychology include (but are not limited to) 
remember/know judgements (Yonelinas, 2002), ease-of-learning judgements (Jemstedt, 
Schwartz, & Jönsson, 2018), familiarity judgements (e.g. Whittlesea & Williams, 2000), post-
decision wagering (Persaud, Peter, & Alan, 2007), and the related "no-loss gambling" method 
(Dienes & Seth, 2010). 
 Findings and implications. Metacognitive experiences predict memory, e.g.  FOK 
(Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001), TOT states (e.g. A. S. Brown, 1991), and "feelings of 
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familiarity" (e.g. Whittlesea & Williams, 2000), both when metacognition occurs before or 
after the retrieval attempt has been initiated. In problem solving, the classic study by Metcalfe 
and Wiebe (1987) showed that warmth ratings predicted closeness to solution for incremental, 
but not insight problems. In implicit learning, metacognitive ratings of confidence distinguish 
cases of explicit learning where knowledge is conscious, from cases of pure implicit learning 
in which knowledge is inaccessible to consciousness (Norman & Price, 2015). 
 The discrepancy that sometimes occurs between metacognition and performance has 
not only been used to infer conscious availability, but has also itself been a focus of cognitive 
research, for instance on the Dunning-Kruger effect (Kruger & Dunning, 1999) and research 
on metacognitive calibration (Pieschl, 2009) where the focus is often how to reduce this 
discrepancy. 
At a general level, research on metacognition in cognitive psychology has provided a 
conceptual and theoretical framework for understanding how people monitor and control their 
own cognitive processes. The applied implications of this are exemplified elsewhere in this 
paper. At a more theoretical level, it has contributed to our understanding of the relationship 
between cognitive processes and corresponding subjective experiences involved in, for 
example, learning and memory, as well as decision-making. 
 
Cognitive Neuroscience 
Central Questions.  
Given that most cognitive tasks act like an intricate concert played by the instruments 
of different brain regions, one asks (1) whether there are brain regions that are necessary or 
sufficient for metacognitive processing, (2) whether metacognitive monitoring or control is a 
domain-general mechanism or a task-specific mechanism? That is, does the processing of the 
meta happen in brain regions activated according to the sensory modality of the task, in 
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(multiple) circumscribed brain regions, or is the meta a property of the neural network itself?  
 Originally, behavior was the only observable read-out. Fortunately, the tools of 
neuroscience allow us to monitor the readout process itself. We can thereby record neural 
populations and start formulating hypotheses about which brain regions are involved when we 
reflect upon our own thoughts and assesses our confidence in them. 
Since information is encoded in neural population codes (Pouget, Dayan, & Zemel, 
2000), where the variance of this code distribution is presumed to represent the precision of 
the percept, one further can ask (3) whether the precision is preserved in further processing 
stages, and (4) whether there is a readout mechanism for the precision or accuracy. If so, this 
could be used as a mechanism to access the confidence of internal states. More broadly, 
within neuroscience one asks, (5) which species possess a readout mechanism for uncertainty, 
and how good is the readout mechanism.  
All and all, metacognition in the neurosciences focuses on the algorithmic and 
implementational level of explaining behavior (Marr & Poggio, 1976). 
 Definition. In cognitive neuroscience, the overarching definition of metacognition is 
cognition about cognition. That is, metacognitive processes are processes beyond the object-
level and part of a hierarchy from sensory/object level to (a) meta level(s). 
 Measurement. Experimental tasks in neuroscience are often paradigms adapted from 
animal psychology (e.g., finding brain regions and decoding the neural firing that corresponds 
to monitoring how a monkey performs a task) and cognitive psychology (e.g., performing 
functional MRI or EEG/MEG when humans make confidence judgments or feeling of 
knowing (FOK) judgements). The field has also benefited from case studies based on patients 
with circumscribed lesions and their accompanied loss of function. Within behavioral 
neuroeconomics, as well as cognitive psychology, an increasingly popular paradigm is post-
decisional wagering where one places a bet depending on one’s certainty to have provided the 
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correct answer (Dienes & Seth, 2010; Persaud et al., 2007; Pfuhl & Biegler, 2012). The higher 
the stakes, the more confident we tend to be about our presumably correct answers. Many 
would regard varieties of post-decision wagering as a more reliable procedure for eliciting 
confidence ratings than more typically used verbal scales.  
Another prominent method uses confidence ratings in a two-alternative forced-choice 
task. This is a recognition task based on discriminating previously seen sample stimuli from 
novel stimuli. By using Signal Detection Theory, one can calculate both a performance score, 
i.e., how well a person can discriminate between seen and not seen stimuli, and a bias score 
(see e.g. Barrett, Dienes, Seth, Appelbaum, & Harlow, 2013; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012).  
Metacognition can also be measured by calculating a metacognitive sensitivity index: 
for example meta-d’. A signal detection statistic like meta-d’ quantifies how well confidence 
ratings discriminate between correct (hits) and incorrect (false alarm) trials (Maniscalco & 
Lau, 2012). A well-calibrated person makes high-confidence judgements for correct trials, 
and low-confidence judgements for incorrect trials. Overconfident persons rate correct and 
incorrect trials with high confidence, and underconfident persons rate correct and incorrect 
trials with low confidence.  
Experimental tasks can be combined with physiological measurements, e.g. fMRI, 
EEG, pupillometry, assessed in patients with prefrontal cortex lesions, across the lifespan 
including persons with dementia, or in persons with mental disorders known to compromise 
insight and self-awareness. These are useful for many other subdisciplines, too (e.g., studies 
within neuropsychology, computational psychiatry).    
Findings and implications. Lesion and brain imaging studies have shown that 
metacognition is separable and distinct from other cognitive processes as well as from entities 
such as episodic memory, perception, decision-making. and reasoning. Furthermore, 
perceptual and mnemonic metacognition engage different brain regions (Rouault, Williams, 
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Allen, & Fleming, 2018). Not surprisingly, monitoring and controlling one’s thoughts engage 
similar brain regions as those engaged by executive functions (Roebers, 2017).  
Different kinds of metacognitive activity seem to be uniquely associated with 
particular brain regions. Based on brain imaging in healthy participants, there is evidence 
showing that prospective judgments engage the rostrolateral and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
whereas retrospective judgments engage the rostromedial prefrontal cortex (PFC) (Fleming, 
Dolan, & Frith, 2012). Confidence judgements of perceptual tasks engage more the lateral 
anterior PFC whereas confidence judgements in mnemonic tasks engage more the medial 
anterior prefrontal cortex (aPFC) (Baird, Smallwood, Gorgolewski & Margulies, 2013). 
Similarly, McCurdy et al. (2013) found that gray matter volume of the aPFC correlated with 
visual perceptual metacognition but not with memory metacognition. The anterior cingulate 
cortex, a region implicated in decision-making, is also activated during monitoring of choices 
(e.g. Baird et al., 2013). Furthermore, the anterior insula seems to be involved in meta-
awareness of emotions (McCaig, Dixon, Keramatian, Liu, & Christoff, 2011) and also 
prospective metamemory (Le Berre et al., 2016). A study measuring meta-d' indicates two 
separable processes: a non-conscious statistical assessment of confidence and a conscious 
single-trial evaluation. The former recruits the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex whereas the 
latter recruits the posterior cingulate cortex (Charles, Van Opstal, Marti, & Dehaene, 2013).  
When assessing metamemory, patients with amnesia (e.g. early Alzheimer) can have 
impaired episodic memory yet intact metamemory. They know they have problems 
remembering. Patients with PFC lesions, on the other hand, often have both poor memory and 
poor metamemory (Janowsky, Shimamura, Kritchevsky, & Squire, 1989).  Similarly, aberrant 
metacognitive judgements are also found in a range of mental disorders, as psychosis, 
obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), and depression (see clinical psychology section). Also, 
both dopamine and noradrenaline have been implicated in metacognition (Hauser, Allen, 
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Purg, Moutoussis, Rees, Dolan, 2017; Lak, Nomoto, Keramati, Sakagami, Kepecz, 2017) with 
the blocking noradrenaline having beneficial effects on metacognition. 
 
Educational Psychology 
Central questions. The central, and arguably most interesting questions related to 
metacognition in educational psychology are: (1) Does metacognition influence learning? 
And (2) can it be taught? Researchers have attempted to provide answers to them both at a 
general level, but also via specific education-related skills and processes such as reading and 
writing. In attempting to answer these questions, researchers have looked for associations 
between measures of metacognition and academic achievement, and for effects of 
metacognitively-oriented educational interventions.  
Definition. Educational psychologists tend to see metacognition as part of the 
overarching concept of self-regulated learning (SRL). SRL can be construed as a framework 
for understanding how cognitive, metacognitive, emotional, motivational, and social aspects 
of learning interact (Panadero, 2017). According to Pintrich (2000), self-regulated learning “is 
an active, constructive process whereby learners set goals for their learning and then attempt 
to monitor, regulate, and control their cognition, motivation, and behavior, guided and 
constrained by their goals and the contextual features in the environment” (p. 453). 
Accordingly, a learner is considered self-regulated to the extent that she is metacognitively, 
motivationally and behaviorally engaged in her own learning process (Zimmerman & Schunk, 
2011, p. 4). 
Measurement. In educational psychology metacognition is most often measured by 
self-report, either through questionnaires or interviews, or by estimating the accuracy of 
metacognitive judgements of learning and/or feelings of knowing (JOL or FOK).  Other 
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measures are also occasionally used, such as observations of student behavior (Dimmitt & 
McCormick, 2012, see also the section on Developmental psychology).  
One of the most commonly used self-report inventories is the Metacognitive 
Awareness Scale, originally developed by Schraw and Dennison (1994). The MAI was 
designed to capture the two-components of the metacognition concept, with separate 
subscales for metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive regulation of cognition (i.e., 
metacognitive control). Since its initial introduction, several variations of the MAI have been 
used – both in the response scale format and in how scores are aggregated. Studies examining 
the scale’s factor structure have been inconsistent in both the choice of analyses and in the 
resulting conclusions (Harrison & Vallin, 2018). This complicates the evaluation of the 
MAI’s psychometric properties, though Harrison and Vallin’s research does seem to indicate 
that a two-factor structure based on a subset of the original items provides a reasonable fit to 
the common, two-component knowledge and control conception of metacognition. 
Mirroring the fact that educational psychologists tend to subsume metacognition under 
self-regulated learning, there are several instruments aimed at measuring self-regulated 
learning that contain metacognition subscales. These include: a) Learning and Study 
Strategies Inventory (LASSI, Weinstein, Schulte, & Palmer, 1987), b) the Motivated 
Strategies for Learning Questionnaire (MSLQ, Pintrich, Smith, Garcia, & McKeachie, 1993) 
where metacognitive self-regulation is one of the two MSLQ subscales, and measures 
planning, monitoring and regulating strategies, and c) the Self-Regulated Learning Interview 
Scale (Zimmerman, 2008; Zimmerman & Martinez-Pons, 1988). 
All of these, including the MAI, are instances of offline, retrospective self-report 
measures. They are thus susceptible to memory distortions and unreliable introspections, and 
may not measure a student’s actual use of metacognitive strategies. They also tend to 
associate with a conception of self-regulation as a relatively stable trait, varying little across 
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contexts. Recently, this conception has shifted towards one where self-regulation is seen as 
less stable and more contextualized, thus requiring online measures that are more closely 
associated with the performance of specific learning or cognitive tasks (see e.g. Panadero, 
Klug, & Järvelä, 2016; Veenman, 2011). Measuring metacognition through the use of 
introspective self-reports collected during the performance of a cognitive task is useful (and 
already covered in the sections on Cognitive neuroscience and Experimental cognitive 
psychology). 
Findings and implications. An important contribution of educational psychology has 
been the examination of the link between metacognition, usually considered as part of SRL, 
and learning, typically measured as academic achievement. Considering the volume of 
research in this field, one might assume that this link is strong and firmly established. 
However, a recent meta-analytic review by Dent and Koenka (2016) found the association to 
be relatively modest, with a mean, weighted correlation (under a random effects model) of r = 
.20. Interestingly, the association was found to be significantly and substantially stronger 
when metacognition and self-regulation were measured by online self-report, rather than 
retrospectively. 
Some degree of metacognitive knowledge and skills, both explicit and implicit, may develop 
as a natural part of growing up (see Developmental and Cognitive neuroscience sections of 
this article) or in our natural inclinations to think and act metacognitively (see Personality and 
Social Psychology section of this article). Another major contribution of educational 
psychology to our understanding of metacognition has been the study of whether and how 
task-specific metacognitive skills can be taught. While the association between self-regulation 
as measured by offline self-reports and academic achievement is relatively weak, it seems that 
metacognitively-oriented educational interventions can have a considerable impact. Dignath, 
Buettner, and Langfeldt (2008) meta-analysed 48 studies of primary school metacognition 
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training programmes, finding a mean standardized effect size (Cohen’s d) on academic 
achievement across reading/writing and mathematics of .62. Similarly, Donker, de Boer, 
Kostons, Dignath van Ewijk, and van der Werf (2014) found an overall effect of learning 
strategies instruction on academic performance (d =  .66) in primary and secondary education, 
with metacognitive strategies being more effective than cognitive strategies. Thus, there is 
convincing evidence that metacognitively oriented educational interventions may positively 
impact student learning. 
Personality and Social Psychology 
Central questions. Within the broad fields of personality and social psychology, 
metacognition encompasses processing and control of one’s own or others mental states and 
processes. For one’s own this include questions related to (1) attitudes, (2) self identity, (3) 
and interpersonal relationships. When applied to how others are thinking, metacognition is 
known as (4) mentalizing (Frith, 2012). Metacognitive monitoring and control might be 
involved in self-regulatory processes important for health, performance, well-being, and 
others. Accordingly, persuasion and social influence (Mercier and Sperber, 2011) as well as 
predicting people’s behavior and reasoning (Briñol and DeMarree, 2012, Frith, 2012) involve 
metacognitive control (Fig 2). However, in these fields, metacognition as a theoretical 
concept is often assessed through related concepts such as self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977), 
cognitive control and need for cognition (Braver, 2012; Cacioppo and Petty, 1982, Shea et al. 
2014), reflective mind (Stanovich, 2001), illusion of control (Langer, 1975), belief in one’s 
knowledge and skills, attitude certainty and importance (Visser, Krosnick, Simmons, 2003), 
as well as behavioral game theory studies assessing social cooperation (Colman, 2003). Self-
perception theory (Bem, 1972), emphasizing the role of inference from observation of own 
behavior in establishing and changing attitudes and self-beliefs, might also be regarded as a 
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metacognitive theory in the sense that attitudes and self-beliefs are summary inferences about 
past behaviors.  
Moreover, in this broad field, metacognitive abilities are often treated as individual 
difference variables. Potential overlaps with other difference variables may occur (e.g. 
openness to experience), which may be one explanation for why metacognition is given a 
relatively modest role in personality research.  
 Definitions. Jost, Kruglanski, and Nelson (1998) suggested an expansive 
understanding of metacognition, including the metacognitive beliefs about others and their 
intentions (see also theory of mind research in the Developmental section of this article). 
Focusing on personality psychology, metacognition is sometimes challenged as a separate 
construct. For example, Batteson, Tormey, and Ritchie (2014) found evidence for a 
theoretical overlap between the conscientiousness and metacognition constructs. Although 
metacognition is often assumed to reflect conscious and controlled processes, Reder (1996) 
argued that the majority of self-regulative processes are actually automatic and nonconscious. 
The lack of direct and explicit access is overcome through discussion and collaborative 
decision-making, hence only humans might have acquired explicit metacognition (Frith, 
2012, Shea et al., 2014). 
Measurement. Metacognitive functioning in this context varies in how it is measured, 
depending on what aspect of metacognition is studied and who is being studied (e.g., children, 
adults). Indeed, the term social is broad, encompassing all kinds of social objects (relationship 
of other people), stereotypes, but also thoughts about institutions (Briñol & DeMarree, 2012). 
In 1982, Cacioppo and Petty developed the Need for Cognition scale, assessing an 
individual’s willingness to engage in effortful cognitive activities. This spurred studies on 
motivation, reflection, and cognitive effort. Stereotypes and attitudes are assessed with a 
combination of implicit measures (e.g. implicit association test) and explicit measures 
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(questionnaires, e.g. Gawronski et al. 2017). Correlations are high, suggesting people are 
aware of their biases (Hahn & Gawronski, 2019). 
Relations between personality traits and metacognition are commonly assessed by 
self-report instruments (see clinical and educational Psychology section).  
Findings and implications. One way of exploring metacognition within personality 
research has been to focus on individual differences in metacognitive skills, which again are 
assumed to reflect differences in metacognitive ability. For example, Gernsbacher and 
colleagues (Gernsbacher et al., 1990) found evidence for individual differences in capturing 
and representing the structure of comprehensible information (“general comprehension 
skill”), supporting an assumption that metacognitive ability may vary in a trait-like fashion 
between individuals. Further, individual differences in cognitive control, as measured with, 
for example, the Need for Cognition scale, is related to cognitive effort in a range of tasks 
(Kool and Botvinick, 2018) and to overriding intuitive but wrong responses (Toplak, West 
and Stanovich, 2014). 
Another approach has been to relate personality traits to metacognitive differences. 
For example, ÿz (2016) explored the relation between the Big Five personality traits and 
metacognitive awareness. The results indicated that Openness to experience and Extraversion 
demonstrated predictive power in determining both metacognitive knowledge and control.  
Individual differences in metacognitive abilities may affect performance in subtle 
ways. For example, if competence is low, performance will suffer, but so will also the 
individual’s ability to recognize it (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). Also, the metacognitive skill to 
recognize poor performance is dependent on the capacity that performance itself depends on. 
For example, participants low in competence on experimental tasks do not only overestimate 
their actual performance, but also fail to realize their poor judgment.  
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Clinical Psychology  
 Central Questions. Researchers in clinical psychology explore the influence of 
metacognition on mental states, and central questions circle around metacognition as a 
working factor in the development or treatment of psychopathology. For example, (1) If a 
metacognitive deficit is associated with psychopathology, how can therapists work with 
patients’ metacognition to improve psychological functioning and mental health? Or (2) Does 
an assumed meta-cognitive deficit reflect the same construct in all psychopathology or does it 
differ from condition to condition?  
 Metacognition in the field of clinical psychology has been dominated by the work of 
Adrian Wells and colleagues since the 1990’s (Wells, 2009; Wells & Matthews, 1994; Wells 
& Purdon, 1999). The focus has been especially on how individuals understand psychiatric 
symptoms and diagnoses and how they respond to them (Lysaker et al., 2011). The goal is to 
tailor therapeutic interventions that help people modify their dysfunctional thoughts and 
develop responses that are more functional (Matthews, 2015). A key purpose is thus to help 
patients identify, understand and repair dysfunctional metacognition. 
 According to the theory of Self-Regulatory Executive Function (S-REF), 
dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs are important contributors to the development and 
perseverance of psychopathology (Wells, 2009; Wells & Matthews, 1994). Worrying, 
rumination, threat-oriented thoughts and other poor coping strategies are seen to constitute a 
cognitive attentional syndrome (CAS). This syndrome is supposedly maintained by 
dysfunctional metacognitions. One example is when a depressed patient perceives worrying 
as an effective coping strategy, and therefore continues worrying. Ergo, it is not only the 
negative content of thoughts (what one thinks) that makes people develop psychopathology, it 
is also dysfunctional beliefs about these thoughts (how one thinks, Wells, 2009). These 
dysfunctional beliefs seem to be common processes associated with various 
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psychopathologies (Sun, Zhu, & So, 2017).  
 On the other hand, well-developed metacognitive skills may foster mastery and more 
functional coping strategies (Semerari et al., 2003). This is related to self-regulation and 
control – how patients may take action and implement strategies to alter an undesirable 
mental state and how they may learn to think critically and rationally about the problematic 
thoughts they experience.  
Another related concept is cognitive insight, which is the capability to identify false 
beliefs and change these with the help of external feedback (Beck & Warman, 2004; Moritz et 
al., 2018). 
Definition. Metacognition is conceptualized as skills that guide information 
processing and judgments about the thoughts and actions of oneself and others (Dimaggio & 
Lysaker, 2015). 
 Measurement. Metacognitive functioning is primarily measured with self-report 
scales (Semerari et al., 2003). One widely used scale is the Meta-Cognition Questionnaire 
(Semerari et al., 2003). Five dimensions of metacognition are represented in the scale: (1) 
Positive beliefs about worry, (2) Negative beliefs about the controllability of thoughts and 
corresponding danger, (3) Cognitive confidence, (4) Negative beliefs about thoughts in 
general, and (5) Metacognitive processes, or self-consciousness. 
 Behavioral measures are also increasingly used. Examples include computer-based 
tasks that involve attention-shifting (e.g. Callinan, Johnson, & Wells, 2015), cognitive 
reflection task (Mækelæ, Moritz, Pfuhl, 2018) or measuring implicit metacognition (Kreis et 
al., 2019, Pfuhl et al., 2015). 
Findings and implications. Deficits in metacognitive abilities are associated with 
various psychiatric diagnoses and problems. Already in the 1980s, Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and 
Frith (1985) found deficits in autistic children’s abilities to form theories about an other’s 
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mind (see also the section on Developmental psychology). Similar patterns have been 
identified for some symptoms of schizophrenia (Brüne, 2005; Frith & Corcoran, 1996). 
Diagnoses where dysfunctional metacognition seems to play a role include schizophrenia 
(Lysaker et al., 2011), depression (Halvorsen et al., 2015; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003), 
obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) (Salkovskis, Richards, & Forrester, 1995), personality 
disorders (Dimaggio & Lysaker, 2015; Fonagy, 1991; Krueger, 2006), anxiety disorders 
(Spada, Nikcevic, Moneta, & Ireson, 2006), anorexia (McDermott & Rushford, 2011), 
hypochondriasis (Bouman & Meijer, 1999), dependencies (Saed, Yaghubi, & Roshan, 2010; 
Spada, Nikcevic, Moneta, & Wells, 2007), gambling (Lindberg, Fernie, & Spada, 2011), 
pathological procrastination (Spada, Hiou, & Nikcevic, 2006) and perceived stress (Roussis & 
Wells, 2008). 
 Since empirical research has shown associations between dysfunctional metacognition 
and psychopathology, metacognitive therapy has been proposed as a psychological treatment 
(Wells, 2001, 2009). Where cognitive therapy challenges the content of the patient’s beliefs 
and thoughts, metacognitive therapy challenges the beliefs about the beliefs (Matthews, 
2015). A cognitive therapist will be interested in the thought patterns that a patient has and try 
to change these into ones that are more constructive. A metacognitive therapist, on the other 
hand, will be interested in what the thoughts mean to the patient, which thinking strategies the 
patient uses, and the knowledge base that guides these strategies (Wells, 2001). For instance, 
a situation may elicit a certain thought in a person, for example “I am worthless”, that makes 
the person feel depressed. Cognitive therapy will question the validity of the thought and try 
to alter it into something else, preferably something that yields a more positive consequence. 
Metacognitive therapy, on the other hand, will first address what the patient thinks and feels 
about the thought, how the patient deals with it and why, and then aim at altering the strategy 
in order to alter the thought.   
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 Metacognitive therapy includes attention training, detached mindfulness and 
behavioral experiments. It has been successful in treating depression and anxiety disorders 
(Kahl, Winter, & Schweiger, 2012; Normann, van Emmerik, & Morina, 2014; Sadeghi, 
Mokhber, Mahmoudi, Asgharipour, & Seyfi, 2015) as well as psychosis (Vitzthum, 
Veckenstedt, & Moritz, 2014). 
 
Animal Psychology 
Central questions. Darwin’s attention to difference of degree, not kind, provides a 
foundation for the understanding how metacognition may have evolved. Ethologists and 
comparative psychologists have built on this when tracing the phylogeny of metacognition 
and, if animals have it, determining what metacognition is good for. Specifically, key 
questions in ethology are (1) which species show metacognition, (2) did it evolve multiple 
times (convergent evolution), (3) how does it contribute to survival (functional argument), 
and (4) is episodic memory a prerequisite for metamemory. 
Definition. Metacognition is defined as any behavior based on accessing internal 
states such as uncertainty or confidence about a memory or a decision. Since researchers in 
this tradition would argue that this does not require conscious awareness, it is referred to 
"implicit" as opposed to "explicit" metacognition (Frith, 2012). 
Measurement. To assess whether animals can express their uncertainty in a 
perceptual judgment task, Smith et al. (1995) introduced a third answer option, a “don’t 
know” response for opting out from difficult decisions. The use of this option might be 
learned through association (e.g. Hampton, 2009), but it spurred the development of assessing 
metacognition non-verbally. 
A now classical paradigm involved measuring how well an animal appears to think it 
will remember (similar to a feeling of knowing measurement in humans) and how well it 
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appears to think it has remembered, i.e. assessing prospective and retrospective metamemory 
judgments (e.g. Goto & Watanabe, 2012; Hampton, 2001; Inman & Shettleworth, 1999, Suda-
King, 2008). In a standard memory task, an animal is presented with a stimulus, and, after a 
delay, is given a task where it has to make a choice between stimuli. If the animal chooses the 
previously seen stimulus, it gets a reward (matching to sample).  
In the prospective condition, to assess prospective metamemory, the animal chooses to 
take the memory test or to decline it. On some trials the animal proceeds directly to the 
memory test without having the option to decline taking the test, so called forced choices. 
Metamemory is thought to be indicated when the animal is better at self-chosen memory tests 
than on the forced tests.  
In the retrospective condition, the animal first takes the test and then can indicate 
either “I think I was right”, or “I am not sure I was right” by e.g. an escape button. Asking for 
confidence after having taken the memory test has been criticized as it could be solved by 
associative learning, i.e. memory may not be a function of “meta” but of perceptual cues such 
as difficulty in retrieving or intertrial intervals (Hampton, 2009).  
Betting (Son & Kornell, 2005) and the willingness to spend effort to access the reward 
(Pfuhl & Biegler, 2012) are cognitive judgements relying on internal cues. In post-decisional 
wagering, the animals are given opportunities to express their degree of uncertainty by 
wagering, for example with tokens, that they are willing to bet that they are correct (Kepecs & 
Mainen, 2012, Son & Kornell, 2005, Morgan et al., 2014, Ferguson et al., 2017). 
Metacognition is indicated by wagering more in easy trials than in difficult trials.  
Choosing an option to collect more information before deciding, referred to as 
information gathering, is tested by hiding a treat either conspicuously or not. Primates as well 
as birds appear to request more information when they have not seen the baiting, indicating 
that they know that they do not know the location of the treat (Güntürkün & Bugnyar, 2016; 
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Mulcahy 2016; Perdue, Evans & Beran, 2018; Kornell, Son & Terrace, 2007). Knowing what 
others know, i.e. whether animals mentalize, has been studied in pilfering paradigms 
(Clayton, Dally, Emery, 2007). 
Findings and implications. Results from metamemory and information gathering 
studies support the notion that a range of animals do, indeed, exhibit metacognition (Kornell, 
2014; Smith, Zakrzewski & Church, 2016), although stimulus discrimination with an opt-out 
response option is seen as a low level form of metacognition (Hampton, 2009, Smith, 2009, 
Kornell, 2014). A non-exhaustive list of animals that have exhibited metacognition includes 
honey bees (Apis mellifera, Perry and Barron, 2013), pigeons (Columbia livia, Iwasaki, 
Watanabe, Fujita, 2018); ravens (Corvus corax, Bugnyar & Heinrich, 2005), dolphins 
(Tursiops truncates, Smith et al., 1995), rats (Rattus norvegicus, Templer, Lee, Preston, 
2017), rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta, Hampton, 2001), orangutans (Suda-King, 2008).  
By requesting rhesus monkeys to make low or high bets where the judgment is based 
on internal cues, and using transfer tasks, Morgan et al. (2014) addressed some of the 
critiques raised about previous task designs. They replicated the findings of Hampton (2001), 
and recently the same two monkeys fell for a metacognitive illusion the same way humans do 
(Ferrigno, Kornell, & Cantlon, 2017).  
Of note, comparative studies suggest that human metacognitive efficiency can be 
explained by associative mechanisms, too (Pfuhl et al., 2013, Smith et al., 2019). This opens 
up a mechanistic understanding how the brain may derive metacognitive performance from 
simpler mechanisms. Indeed, animals, including humans, may use heuristic cues and judge 
the accuracy of their memory based on perceptual cues (Ferrigno et al., 2017, Hampton, 2009; 
Pfuhl et al., 2009). Furthermore, the behavioral paradigms have been combined with 
theoretical models (e.g. Kepecs & Mainen, 2012), and the tools of neuroscience such as 
multielectrode recordings, calcium imaging, optogenetics. These toolshave shed light on 
Metacognition in psychology 
 
31 
where and how in the brain the “meta” is processed (see Neuroscience section). Studies in 
rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta), for example, implicate the primate frontal cortex in 
monitoring choices (Middlebrooks & Sommer, 2012). The parietal cortex has been implicated 
for certainty in perceptual decision-making (Kiani & Shadlen, 2009) and neural activity in a 
task-specific area, such as the supplementary eye field, has been found to be related to post-
decisional wagering.  
Current data suggest that metacognition may not have evolved linearly1. 
Metacognition could be understood as an emergent property of ecological necessities and 
computing capacity (Pfuhl et al., 2009, 2011). The extent to which these results from animal 
psychology can be regarded as indicative of metacognition, depends on the extent to which 
consciousness is considered a definitional property of metacognition. Nevertheless, knowing 
the minimal requirements for indicating what one might refer to as "implicit" metacognition 
(Frith, 2012; Hampton, 2009) can, indeed, advance our understanding of phylogenetic and 
developmental aspects of metacognition. 
Discussion 
Key components of metacognition addressed across disciplines 
 Our literature search shows that across the chosen psychological disciplines, there is 
consistently a stronger focus on metacognitive control than on metacognitive monitoring as 
measured in terms of number of records that included each of the concepts in the title, 
abstract, subject headings or key concepts. Because metacognitive monitoring is a 
prerequisite for metacognitive control, this does not necessarily imply that control is in reality 
given less weight than monitoring. Nevertheless, it suggests that authors are at least more 
likely to emphasize the role of control over monitoring.  
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Even though the different psychological disciplines showed similarities in terms of 
their common emphasis on function, there are some differences in terms of which facets of 
metacognition are referred to across the different psychological disciplines. In neuroscience 
and animal psychology, metacognitive knowledge is addressed more often than the two other 
facets. In developmental and educational psychology, the strongest emphasis is on 
metacognitive experiences whereas in cognitive psychology, metacognitive strategy is most 
frequently addressed. In clinical and personality/social psychology, the research focus is 
distributed fairly equally across all three facets. 
It is our hope that the identification of functions and facets of metacognition that have 
been researched within and across psychological subdisciplines, together with our overview 
addressing key elements within each subdiscipline, can serve as a novel contribution to 
metacognition research. Comparative studies of metacognition are rare, and, to our 
knowledge, no previous studies have combined the type of systematic literature searches we 
have conducted, with a systematic overview of central questions, definitions, methods, and 
findings from the same set of subdisciplines. 
Even if two subdisciplines have the same relative focus on a given facet of 
metacognition, this does not necessarily mean that metacognition is defined or measured in 
the same way in those subdisciplines. In other cases, the situation might be the opposite. What 
appears to be a diverging focus could sometimes conceal a largely overlapping research focus. 
We now turn to a closer discussion of similarities and differences across psychological 
disciplines in terms of central questions, definitions and measurement of metacognition. 
Central questions 
 As is evident from our overview, the concept of metacognition has been addressed for 
different purposes and with different emphasis in different areas of psychology. Sometimes, 
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metacognitive issues have been addressed only indirectly and under other labels. The research 
questions show a large variation, ranging from the basic questions on when and how it 
develops in children (cf. developmental psychology), when and for what purpose 
metacognition once evolved and whether it is even restricted to our species (cf. animal 
research), which role it plays in learning and human functioning (cf. cognitive, educational, 
cognitive neuroscience and social/personality psychology), and to the more focused and 
applied questions of how teachers can improve metacognition in students (cf. educational 
psychology) and how therapists can modify dysfunctional metacognition in order to improve 
mental health (cf. clinical psychology).  
It could even be argued that the research questions identified in our overview together 
represent such a wide range and target issues of such fundamental nature that they overlap 
with nearly all the foundational questions in psychology. Given that the ability for 
metacognitive reflection is often seen as characteristic of what makes us "human" (though this 
is challenged by findings from animal research, and from people who lack the cognitive 
resources for metacognition), it is perhaps not surprising that metacognition is increasingly 
often included as a component in models that attempt to understand a diversity of human 
thoughts and behaviors.  
We are of course not the first to argue that metacognition is a fundamental ability with 
wide-ranging implications. As pointed out by Lempert, Chen, and Fleming (2015), “The 
ability to accurately appraise one’s uncertainty, known as 'metacognitive' accuracy, is thus 
crucial for guiding adaptive behavior, particularly when direct feedback from the environment 
is unavailable.”  
So how differently is metacognition defined within and across the various sub-
disciplines we have addressed? 




Similarities across disciplines. One of the aims of this article was to present and 
compare definitions of metacognition from different fields of psychology. From this 
overview, it seems that most can agree on what metacognition is, broadly speaking. Most 
definitions either state or imply that metacognition has to do with awareness of one's own 
cognitive activity, that such awareness implies a form of monitoring which in turn increases 
the person's control over their own cognitive processes. Whereas this awareness is studied as 
a more implicit, preverbal or experience-based faculty in some disciplines (e.g., 
developmental psychology, some aspects of experimental cognitive psychology, 
neuroscience, and animal research), it is studied as a more explicit, verbal or information-
based faculty in sub-disciplines more focused on how metacognition can be applied (e.g., 
developmental, social, educational and clinical psychology), although a thorough discussion 
of this is beyond the scope of this paper.  
Moreover, there is wide agreement that metacognition has multiple facets, and the 
distinction between metacognitive knowledge, skills/strategies and experience (Flavell, 1979) 
is still applied in different domains, suggesting that this distinction is regarded as meaningful 
and useful. Interestingly, Flavell's fourth facet, "goals (or tasks)", which refers to the objective 
of the cognitive activity in question, is rarely mentioned explicitly. However, one might argue 
that a representation of one's goal would always be a necessary component (or premise) of 
metacognitive regulation. The lack of reference to this facet could therefore be due to its 
implicit role in metacognitive regulation. Indeed, Flavell was clear that person, task and 
strategies interact and rely on knowledge of cognition and the monitoring and regulation of 
cognition. Recent research on implementation intentions … (?) 
 Another recurring theme is that metacognition is useful, and that the acquisition of 
metacognitive skills should therefore be encouraged. Most seem to regard metacognition as 
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an activity that has important functions. In basic developmental, cognitive and educational 
psychology it is regarded as an integral part of various cognitive activities, for instance 
problem solving and learning. In those parts of clinical psychology that specifically address 
metacognition, it seems to be regarded as an important element for psychological well-being. 
Mental illnesses are understood to involve some kind of maladaptive metacognitive 
tendencies. Thus, therapy must address those insufficiencies and aim to improve 
metacognitive regulation, e.g., the ability to stop rumination.  
It follows from this that most also seem to regard metacognition as something that, to 
some extent, develops naturally, can be developed further or learned through experience and 
reflection, learned, and/or refined. This is the case even though there is also agreement that 
there are relatively stable individual differences in people's basic sensitivity to metacognitive 
feelings (Fleming et al., 2012), and also that there is substantial variation in people's 
metacognitive strategies and knowledge by age, experience, personality, situation and task.  
In spite of these differences, most researchers seem to agree that there is sufficient 
possibility for growth and change in metacognitive abilities, that this process follows some 
reliable patterns early in life, and that it is meaningful to address both in educational and 
therapeutic contexts. In fact, educational interventions targeting metacognition do seem to 
positively influence academic achievement (Dignath et al., 2008; Donker et al., 2014).   
Also, after almost 50 years where cognitive therapy has been widely used for a range 
of psychopathologies, a third wave of cognitive behavioral therapies has emerged, trying to 
address the limitations in previous treatments (Kahl et al., 2012). Metacognition is a central 
and useful element in several of these new therapies (Moritz et al., 2014; Moritz et al., 2018; 
Vitzthum et al., 2014). 
Inconsistencies and disagreements across disciplines. What is controlled and 
monitored by metacognition? The focus on what is studied and why varies in the different 
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perspectives we have presented here. Early childhood studies tend to focus much more on 
metacognitive activity related to managing human interactions and making accurate 
predictions about the environment children are learning to navigate. In experimental cognitive 
psychology, the focus is often on what kind of information-processing antecedents 
metacognitive feelings are based on (Koriat, 2007). In cognitive neuropsychology, studies 
focus more on which regions of the brain are involved in metacognitive processing (Fleming, 
Dolan & Frith, 2012). In personality psychology, the focus is more on individual differences 
and what that means for the expression of metacognition (Rouault et al., 2018), and in social 
psychology, the focus is also on moral decisions, and beliefs about other people and their 
intentions (Frith, 2012; Pfuhl, Haghish & Biegler. 2013). In more applied settings, research in 
educational psychology focuses more on metacognitive activity that helps people learn and 
function effectively in learning environments (Dimmitt & McCormick, 2012) while research 
in clinical psychology focuses more on helping people with their metacognitive activity 
related to identifying and repairing their dysfunctional beliefs (Matthews, 2015). Finally, 
animal studies are designed to capture evidence of feelings of knowing (Do I know enough to 
perform the task?) and evaluation judgements (Did I do the task well enough?) (Hampton, 
2009; Kornell, 2014).   
Measurement 
Across different disciplines, there is large variation in the types of methods used to 
measure metacognition. These are commonly linked to the guiding definitions typical of the 
field.  
Where research is more focused on awareness or management of implicit, preverbal or 
experience-based nature of metacognition, methods commonly used include, for example, 
observation of behaviors such as infant turn-taking and gaze, judgements of knowing based 
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on implicitly learned information, brain-imaging during feeling of knowing tasks or decision-
making, and studies of animal metamemory or information gathering. 
On the other hand, where research is more focused on awareness and/or management 
of explicit, verbal or more information-based aspects of metacognition, methods commonly 
used involve conscious thought about what one knows. These include interviews and think-
aloud procedures, and self-report ratings/questionnaires.  
The wide variety in methods used may be taken to indicate that we are perhaps dealing 
with different subcategories of the same phenomenon, if not outright different phenomena. 
Therefore, any researcher in the field of metacognition would need to be explicit about their 
working definition of metacognition and argue for the appropriateness of methodological 
choice -- using “online” measures that capture knowledge that may not be explicitly available 
to us, or using “offline” measures that capture what we allegedly have explicit access to 
through retrospection or reflection.  
There is an interesting conundrum here. If our online behaviors or offline reports are 
about what we think we know about our cognitive processes, such measures should be 
regarded as reasonable measures of metacognition. Nonetheless, it could be argued that online 
observations are more telling of what is "really going on". However, if what we think is going 
on varies from what is observed, what is ultimately the better measure of metacognition? 
There is often no one accuracy test that distinguishes "real" or “accurate” metacognition from 
"fake" or “inaccurate” metacognition. Therefore, some metacognitive beliefs may be more 
functional and beneficial than others, essential for healthy behavior and development, while 
others may ultimately prove to be outright dysfunctional or get us in trouble. Hence, the value 
of measuring the outcomes of metacognitive approaches to learning (more proactive 
approaches to functional growth) and metacognitively motivated clinical therapies (more 
reactive approaches to dysfunctions). When researchers can assess performance “accurately” 
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(in terms of what is adaptive for any given situation), assessment of metacognitive skills may 
reveal inaccuracies or biases that can be more informative for when and how metacognition 
can be dysfunctional (Kruger & Dunning, 1999).  
This leads us to an important point, namely that metacognitive ratings are not 
synonymous with the traditional notion of introspection. This was pointed out already by 
Nelson and Narens (1990), who stressed the fact that the most interesting aspect of 
metacognitive measures is that they allow us to compare the individual’s perception of their 
own cognitive processes with objective measures of those same processes. This makes it 
possible to identify when the two correspond and when they deviate. Thus, metacognitive 
ratings are rarely of interest in and of themselves and should not be taken to accurately reflect 
cognitive processing. Instead of using people’s introspections to draw inferences about how 
the mind works, then, metacognition researchers deliberately examine how people think the 
mind works and the role that those (faulty or accurate) beliefs play in their cognitive control. 
Implications and conclusions 
 Based on the large variety in research questions, definitions and methodological 
approaches, one could draw a similar conclusion to Reder (1996), namely that the concept of 
metacognition has different meaning for different researchers, that some operationalizations 
have very little in common (Table 1), and that "metacognition" is no longer a unitary concept. 
When a theoretical concept becomes too broad it also risks losing its explanatory value, or 
losing some important nuance of the phenomenon. 
However, depending on one’s view on what should be the minimum requirement of a 
definition of an “umbrella” concept, a different conclusion could also be drawn — namely 
that the concept of metacognition is still meaningful and useful. Though Flavell galvanized 
this field of research within the domain of developmental psychology, it has roots in several 
fields and has borne fruit in even more. We suggest that the different operationalizations of 
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metacognition presented in this review all reflect the same class of experience, namely the 
ability to think about one’s own thinking, whether consciously or not. With the wide range of 
questions/phenomena that metacognition is meant to address within a variety of research 
fields, it is perhaps most meaningful to think of it as a class of experience or a level of human 
functioning, rather than a specific mechanism or function, as often specified in educational or 
clinical settings.  
Likewise, a topic we have touched upon in this paper, but not elaborated on, is the 
relationship between metacognition and neighbouring concepts like theory of mind, self-
regulation, , self-efficacy, bodily awareness, and the like. One could argue that the lines 
between these concepts and metacognition are blurry. We leave that for future studies to 
address. 
In sum, any theoretical explanation or intervention that addresses the "meta"-level of 
human cognition could potentially benefit from both general knowledge about the very core 
of metacognition, namely the human ability to reflect upon and let behavior be guided by 
knowledge about one's own mental states, as well as knowledge of metacognition derived 
from other psychological disciplines. As in other areas of psychology, differences in focus on 
the “basic” vs. more “applied” research fields may provide important insights for both 
practice-informed basic research as well as basic research-informed practice. Without basic 
research in developmental psychology, cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, 
personality and social psychology, and animal studies, we might be less systematic in our 
conceptualizations and research methods than we could be.  At the same time, without applied 
research, we might miss the needs, value and appropriate use of metacognition in order to 
function well in our everyday (as we grow, learn and lead mentally healthy lives). If we no 
longer used the umbrella concept of metacognition, this potential advantage may be lost. 
However, as argued above, the variety of approaches necessitates that researchers be specific 
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and explicit about their chosen angle in any given study – something that is perhaps easier 
when we have greater awareness of how it is approached in other fields.  
  




ÿz, H. (2016). The importance of personality traits in students' perceptions of metacognitive 
awareness. Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences, 232, 655-667. 
doi:10.1016/j.sbspro.2016.10.090 
American Psychological Association. (n.d.-a). PsycINFO Classification Categories and Codes [web 
page]. Retrieved from https://www.apa.org/pubs/databases/training/class-codes 
American Psychological Association. (n.d.-b). Thesaurus of Psychological Index Terms [web page]. 
Retrieved from https://www.apa.org/pubs/databases/training/thesaurus 
Baird, B., Smallwood, J., Gorgolewski, K. J., & Margulies, D. S. (2013). Medial and lateral networks in 
anterior prefrontal cortex support metacognitive ability for memory and perception. J 
Neurosci, 33(42), 16657-16665. doi:10.1523/jneurosci.0786-13.2013 
Bandura, A. (1977). Self-efficacy: Toward a unifying theory of behavioral change. Psychological 
Review, 84(2), 191-215. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.84.2.191 
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind” ? 
Cognition, 21(1), 37-46. doi:10.1016/0010-0277(85)90022-8 
Barrett, A. B., Dienes, Z., Seth, A. K., Appelbaum, M. I., & Harlow, L. L. (2013). Measures of 
metacognition on signal-detection theoretic models. Psychological methods, 18(4), 535-552. 
doi:10.1037/a0033268 
Batteson, T. J., Tormey, R., & Ritchie, T. D. (2014). Approaches to learning, metacognition and 
personality: An exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis. Procedia - Social and Behavioral 
Sciences, 116, 2561-2567. doi:10.1016/j.sbspro.2014.01.611 
Beck, A. T., & Warman, D. M. (2004). Cognitive insight: Theory and assessment. In X. F. Amador & A. 
S. David (Eds.), Insight and psychosis: Awareness of illness in schizophrenia and related 
disorders (2 ed., pp. 79-87). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bem, D. J. (1972). Self-perception theory. In Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 6, pp. 
1-62). Academic Press. 
Metacognition in psychology 
 
42 
Beran, M. J., Brandl, J. L., Perner, J., & Proust, J. (2012). On the nature, evolution, development, and 
epistemology of metacognition: Introductory thoughts. In M. J. Beran, J. L. Brandl, J. Perner, 
& J. Proust (Eds.), Foundations of Metacognition (pp. 1-18). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bouman, T. K., & Meijer, K. J. (1999). A preliminary study of worry and metacognitions in 
hypochondriasis. Clinical Psychology & Psychotherapy, 6(2), 96-101. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-
0879(199905)6:2<96::AID-CPP190>3.0.CO;2-G 
Brandl, J. L. (2012). Pretend play in early childhood: The road between mentalism and behaviourism. 
In M. J. Beran, J. L. Brandl, J. Perner, & J. Proust (Eds.), Foundations of metacognition (pp. 
146-166). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Braver, T. S. (2012). The variable nature of cognitive control: a dual mechanisms framework. Trends 
in Cognitive Sciences, 16(2), 106-113. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2011.12.010 
Brinck, I., & Liljenfors, R. (2013). The developmental origin of metacognition. Infant and Child 
Development, 22(1), 85-101. doi:10.1002/icd.1749 
Briñol, P., & DeMarree, K. G. (2012). Social Metacognition, Psychology Press, New York. 
Brown, A. L. (1977). Knowing when, where and how to remember: a problem of metacognition. In R. 
Glaser (Ed.). Advances in instructional psychology. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Brown, A. S. (1991). A review of the tip-of-the-tongue experience. Psychological Bulletin, 109(2), 204-
223. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.109.2.204 
Brown, R., & McNeill, D. (1966). The “tip of the tongue” phenomenon. Journal of Verbal Learning and 
Verbal Behavior, 5(4), 325-337. doi:10.1016/S0022-5371(66)80040-3 
Brüne, M. (2005). “Theory of mind” in schizophrenia: A review of the literature. Schizophrenia 
Bulletin, 31(1), 21-42. doi:10.1093/schbul/sbi002 
Bugnyar, T., & Heinrich, B. (2005). Ravens, Corvus corax, differentiate between knowledgeable and 
ignorant competitors. Proceedings. Biological sciences, 272(1573), 1641-1646. 
doi:10.1098/rspb.2005.3144 
Metacognition in psychology 
 
43 
Cacioppo, J. T., & Petty, R. E. (1982). The need for cognition. J Pers Soc Psychol, 42(1), 116-131. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.42.1.116 
Callinan, S., Johnson, D., & Wells, A. (2015). A randomised controlled study of the effects of the 
attention training technique on traumatic stress symptoms, emotional attention set shifting 
and flexibility. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 39(1), 4-13. doi:10.1007/s10608-014-9634-8 
Castel, A. D., Middlebrooks, C. D., & McGillivray, S. (2016). Monitoring memory in old age: 
Impaired, spared, and aware. Oxford library of psychology. The Oxford handbook of 
metamemory, 519-535.  
Charles, L., Van Opstal, F., Marti, S., & Dehaene, S. (2013). Distinct brain mechanisms for conscious 
versus subliminal error detection. Neuroimage, 73, 80-94. 
doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.01.054 
Clayton, N. S., Dally, J. M., & Emery, N. J. (2007). Social cognition by food-caching corvids. The 
western scrub-jay as a natural psychologist. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci, 362(1480), 
507-522. doi:10.1098/rstb.2006.1992 
Colman, A. M. (2003). Cooperation, psychological game theory, and limitations of rationality in social 
interaction. Behav Brain Sci, 26(2), 139-153; discussion 153-198. 
Dent, A. L., & Koenka, A. C. (2016). The relation between self-regulated learning and academic 
achievement across childhood and adolescence: A meta-analysis. Educational Psychology 
Review, 28(3), 425-474. doi:10.1007/s10648-015-9320-8 
Dienes, Z., & Seth, A. (2010). Gambling on the unconscious: A comparison of wagering and 
confidence ratings as measures of awareness in an artificial grammar task. Consciousness and 
Cognition, 19(2), 674-681. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2009.09.009 
Dignath, C., Buettner, G., & Langfeldt, H.-P. (2008). How can primary school students learn self-
regulated learning strategies most effectively? A meta-analysis on self-regulation training 
programmes. Educational Research Review, 3(2), 101-129. doi:10.1016/j.edurev.2008.02.003 
Metacognition in psychology 
 
44 
Dimaggio, G., & Lysaker, P. H. (2015). Metacognition and mentalizing in the psychotherapy of 
patients with psychosis and personality disorders. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 71(2), 117-
124. doi:10.1002/jclp.22147 
Dimmitt, C., & McCormick, C. B. (2012). Metacognition in education. In K. R. Harris, S. Graham, & T. 
Urdan (Eds.), APA educational psychology handbook, Vol 1: Theories, constructs, and critical 
issues. (pp. 157-187). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
Donker, A. S., de Boer, H., Kostons, D., Dignath van Ewijk, C. C., & van der Werf, M. P. C. (2014). 
Effectiveness of learning strategy instruction on academic performance: A meta-analysis. 
Educational Research Review, 11, 1-26. doi:10.1016/j.edurev.2013.11.002 
Dunlosky, J., & Metcalfe, J. (2009). Metacognition. Los Angeles: SAGE. 
Efklides, A. (2008). Metacognition: Defining its facets and levels of functioning in relation to self-
regulation and co-regulation. European Psychologist, 13(4), 277-287. doi:10.1027/1016-
9040.13.4.277 
Efklides, A. (2011). Interactions of Metacognition With Motivation and Affect in Self-Regulated 
Learning: The MASRL Model AU - Efklides, Anastasia. Educational Psychologist, 46(1), 6-25. 
doi:10.1080/00461520.2011.538645 
Ellis, A. (1962). Reason and emotion in psychotherapy. Oxford: Lyle Stuart. 
Emanuel Robinson, A., Hertzog, C., & Dunlosky, J. (2006). Aging, encoding fluency, and 
metacognitive monitoring. Aging, Neuropsychology, and Cognition, 13(3-4), 458-478. 
Esken, F. (2012). Early forms of metacognition in human children. In M. J. Beran, J. L. Brandl, J. 
Perner, & J. Proust (Eds.), Foundations of metacognition (pp. 134-145). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Ferrigno, S., N. Kornell and J. F. Cantlon (2017). A metacognitive illusion in monkeys. Proc Biol Sci 
284(1862). 
Flavell, J. H. (1979). Metacognition and cognitive monitoring: A new area of cognitive-developmental 
inquiry. American Psychologist, 34, 906-911. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.34.10.906 
Metacognition in psychology 
 
45 
Flavell, J. H. (2004). Theory-of-mind development: Retrospect and prospect. Merrill-Palmer 
Quarterly, 50(3), 274-290. doi:10.1353/mpq.2004.0018 
Flavell, J. H., & Wellman, H. M. (1977). Metamemory. In R. V. Kail & J. W. Hagen (Eds.), Perspectives 
on the development of memory and cognition (pp. 3-34). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Fleming, S. M., Dolan, R. J., & Frith, C. D. (2012). Metacognition: Computation, biology and function. 
Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences, 
367(1594), 1280-1286. doi:10.1098/rstb.2012.0021 
Fonagy, P. (1991). Thinking about thinking: Some clinical and theoretical considerations in the 
treatment of a borderline patient. The International journal of psycho-analysis, 72, 639-656.  
Frith, C. D. (2012). The role of metacognition in human social interactions. Philosophical Transactions 
of the Royal Society of London, Series B, Biological Sciences, 367(1599), 2213-2223. 
doi:10.1098/rstb.2012.0123 
Frith, C. D., & Corcoran, R. (1996). Exploring ‘theory of mind’ in people with schizophrenia. 
Psychological Medicine, 26(3), 521-530. doi:10.1017/S0033291700035601 
Gawronski, B., Morrison, M., Phills, C. E., & Galdi, S. (2017). Temporal Stability of Implicit and Explicit 
Measures: A Longitudinal Analysis. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 43(3), 300-312. 
doi:10.1177/0146167216684131 
Gernsbacher, M. A., Varner, K. R., & Faust, M. E. (1990). Investigating differences in general 
comprehension skill. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cogntion, 
16(3), 430-445. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.16.3.430 
Geurten, M., & Lemaire, P. (2017). Age-related differences in strategic monitoring during 
arithmetic problem solving. Acta psychologica, 180, 105-116. 
Goto, K., & Watanabe, S. (2012). Large-billed crows (Corvus macrorhynchos) have retrospective but 
not prospective metamemory. Animal Cognition, 15(1), 27-35. doi:10.1007/s10071-011-
0428-z 
Metacognition in psychology 
 
46 
Gray, W. S. (1925). The twenty-fourth yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education: 
Part I. Bloomington, IL: Public School Publishing. 
Güntürkün, O., & Bugnyar, T. (2016). Cognition without cortex. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 20(4), 
291-303. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2016.02.001 
Hahn, A., & Gawronski, B. (2019). Facing one’s implicit biases: From awareness to acknowledg-ment. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 116(5), 769-794 
Halvorsen, M., Hagen, R., Hjemdal, O., Eriksen, M. S., Sørli, Å. J., Waterloo, K., . . . Wang, C. E. A. 
(2015). Metacognitions and Thought Control Strategies in Unipolar Major Depression: A 
Comparison of Currently Depressed, Previously Depressed, and Never-Depressed Individuals. 
Cognitive Therapy and Research, 39(1), 31-40. doi:10.1007/s10608-014-9638-4 
Hampton, R. R. (2001). Rhesus monkeys know when they remember. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 98(9), 5359-5362. doi:10.1073/pnas.071600998 
Hampton, R. R. (2009). Multiple demonstrations of metacognition in nonhumans: Converging 
evidence or multiple mechanisms? Comparative cognition & behavior reviews, 4, 17-28. 
Harlow, H. F. (1949). The formation of learning sets. Psychological Review, 56(1), 51-65. 
doi:10.1037/h0062474 
Harrison, G. M., & Vallin, L. M. (2018). Evaluating the metacognitive awareness inventory using 
empirical factor-structure evidence. Metacognition and Learning, 13(1), 15-38. 
doi:10.1007/s11409-017-9176-z 
Hart, J. T., & Kuhlen, R. G. (1965). Memory and the feeling-of-knowing experience. Journal of 
Educational Psychology, 56(4), 208-216. doi:10.1037/h0022263 
Haslbeck, J. M. B., & Waldorp, L. J. (2019). Mgm: Estimating time-varying mixed graphical models in 
high-dimensional data, version 6 [R-package]. Retrieved from 
https://arxiv.org/abs/1510.06871 
Hauser, T. U., Allen, M., Purg, N., Moutoussis, M., Rees, G., & Dolan, R. J. (2017). Noradrenaline 
blockade specifically enhances metacognitive performance. eLife, 6. doi:10.7554/eLife.24901 
Metacognition in psychology 
 
47 
Hertzog, C. (2016). Aging and metacognitive control. In J. Dunlosky & S. K. Tauber (Eds.), 
Oxford library of psychology. The Oxford handbook of metamemory (pp. 537-558). 
New York, NY, US: Oxford University Press. 
Inman, A., & Shettleworth, S. J. (1999). Detecting metamemory in nonverbal subjects: A test with 
pigeons. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 25(3), 389-395. 
doi:10.1037/0097-7403.25.3.389 
Iwasaki, S., Watanabe, S., & Fujita, K. (2018). Pigeons (Columba livia) know when they will need hints: 
prospective metacognition for reference memory? Anim Cogn, 21(2), 207-217. 
doi:10.1007/s10071-017-1153-z 
Janowsky, J. S., Shimamura, A. P., Kritchevsky, M., & Squire, L. R. (1989). Cognitive impairment 
following frontal lobe damage and its relevance to human amnesia. Behavioral Neuroscience, 
103(3), 548-560. doi:10.1037/0735-7044.103.3.548 
Jemstedt, A., Schwartz, B. L., & Jönsson, F. U. (2018). Ease-of-learning judgments are based on both 
processing fluency and beliefs. Memory, 26(6), 807-815. 
doi:10.1080/09658211.2017.1410849 
Jost, J. T., Kruglanski, A. W., & Nelson, T. O. (1998). Social metacognition: An expansionist review. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 2(2), 137-154. doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr0202_6 
Kahl, K. G., Winter, L., & Schweiger, U. (2012). The third wave of cognitive behavioural therapies: 
what is new and what is effective? Current Opinion in Psychiatry, 25(6), 522-528. 
doi:10.1097/YCO.0b013e328358e531 
Kepecs, A., & Mainen, Z. F. (2012). A computational framework for the study of confidence in 
humans and animals. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series B, 
Biological Sciences, 367(1594), 1322-1337. doi:10.1098/rstb.2012.0037 
Kiani, R., & Shadlen, M. N. (2009). Representation of confidence associated with a decision by 
neurons in the parietal cortex. Science, 324(5928), 759-764. doi:10.1126/science.1169405 
Metacognition in psychology 
 
48 
Killeen, P. R. (1978). Superstition: A Matter of Bias, Not Detectability. Science, 199(4324), 88-90. 
doi:10.1126/science.199.4324.88 
Kloo, D., & Rohwer, M. (2012). The development of earlier and later forms of metacognitive abilities: 
Reflections on agency and ignorance. In M. J. Beran, J. L. Brandl, J. Perner, & J. Proust (Eds.), 
Foundations of metacognition (pp. 167-180). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kool, W., & Botvinick, M. (2018). Mental labour. Nature Human Behaviour, 2(12), 899-908. 
doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0401-9 
Koriat, A. (2007). Metacognition and consciousness. In P. D. Zelazo, M. Moscovich, & E. Thompson 
(Eds.), The Cambridge handbook of consciousness (pp. 289-325). New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Koriat, A., & Levy-Sadot, R. (2001). The combined contributions of the cue-familiarity and 
accessibility heuristics to feelings of knowing. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 27(1), 34-53. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.27.1.34 
Kornell, N. (2014). Where is the “meta” in animal metacognition? Journal of Comparative Psychology, 
128(2), 143-149. doi:10.1037/a0033444 
Kornell, N., Son, L. K., & Terrace, H. S. (2007). Transfer of metacognitive skills and hint seeking in 
monkeys. Psychol Sci, 18(1), 64-71. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01850.x 
Kreis, I., Biegler, R., Tjelmeland, H., Mittner, M., Reitan, S. K., Pfuhl, G. (2019).Probabilistic Reasoning 
in Schizophrenia and Autism: Investigating the Roles of Memory and Un-certainty. OSF 
Preprints. doi:10.31219/osf.io/ea3kz 
Krueger, R. F. (2006). Continuity of Axes I and II: Toward a unified model of personality, personality 
disorders, and clinical disorders. In T. A. Widiger, E. Simonsen, P. J. Sirovatka, & D. A. Regier 
(Eds.), Dimensional models of personality disorders: Refining the research agenda for DSM-V. 
Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Association. 
Metacognition in psychology 
 
49 
Kruger, J., & Dunning, D. (1999). Unskilled and unaware of it: How difficulties in recognizing one's 
own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 77(6), 1121-1134. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.77.6.1121 
Lak, A., Nomoto, K., Keramati, M., Sakagami, M., & Kepecs, A. (2017). Midbrain Dopamine Neurons 
Signal Belief in Choice Accuracy during a Perceptual Decision. Curr Biol, 27(6), 821-832. 
doi:10.1016/j.cub.2017.02.026 
Le Berre, A. P., Muller-Oehring, E. M., Kwon, D., Serventi, M. R., Pfefferbaum, A., & Sullivan, E. V. 
(2016). Differential compromise of prospective and retrospective metamemory monitoring 
and their dissociable structural brain correlates. Cortex, 81, 192-202. 
doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2016.05.002 
Lempert, K. M., Chen, Y. L., & Fleming, S. M. (2015). Relating Pupil Dilation and Metacognitive 
Confidence during Auditory Decision-Making. PLoS ONE, 10(5), e0126588. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0126588 
Lindberg, A., Fernie, B. A., & Spada, M. M. (2011). Metacognitions in problem gambling. Journal of 
Gambling Studies, 27(1), 73-81. doi:10.1007/s10899-010-9193-1. 
Lysaker, P. H., Erickson, M., Ringer, J., Buck, K. D., Semerari, A., Carcione, A., & Dimaggio, G. (2011). 
Metacognition in schizophrenia: The relationship of mastery to coping, insight, self-esteem, 
social anxiety, and various facets of neurocognition. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 
50(4), 412-424. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8260.2010.02003.x 
Maniscalco, B., & Lau, H. (2012). A signal detection theoretic approach for estimating metacognitive 
sensitivity from confidence ratings. Conscious and Cognition, 21(1), 422-430. 
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2011.09.021 
Marr, D., & Poggio, T. (1976). Cooperative computation of stereo disparity. Science, 194(4262), 283-
287. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/1742217. (Accession No. 968482) 
Metacognition in psychology 
 
50 
Matthews, G. (2015). Advancing the theory and practice of metacognitive therapy: A commentary on 
the special issue. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 39(1), 81-87. doi:10.1007/s10608-014-
9663-3 
McCaig, R. G., Dixon, M., Keramatian, K., Liu, I., & Christoff, K. (2011). Improved modulation of 
rostrolateral prefrontal cortex using real-time fMRI training and meta-cognitive awareness. 
Neuroimage, 55(3), 1298-1305. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.12.016 
McCurdy, L. Y., Maniscalco, B., Metcalfe, J., Liu, K. Y., de Lange, F. P., & Lau, H. (2013). Anatomical 
coupling between distinct metacognitive systems for memory and visual perception. J 
Neurosci, 33(5), 1897-1906. doi:10.1523/jneurosci.1890-12.2013 
McDermott, C. J., & Rushford, N. (2011). Dysfunctional metacognitions in anorexia nervosa. Eating 
and Weight Disorders - Studies on Anorexia, Bulimia and Obesity, 16(1), e49-e55. 
doi:10.1007/bf03327521 
Mecacci, L., & Righi, S. (2006). Cognitive failures, metacognitive beliefs and aging. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 40(7), 1453-1459. 
Mercier, H., & Sperber, D. (2011). Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory. 
Behav Brain Sci, 34(2), 57-74; discussion 74-111. doi:10.1017/s0140525x10000968 
Metcalfe, J., Schwartz, B. L., Joaquim, S. G., & Rayner, K. (1993). The Cue-Familiarity Heuristic in 
Metacognition. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 19(4), 
851-861. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.19.4.851 
Metcalfe, J., & Wiebe, D. (1987). Intuition in insight and noninsight problem solving. Memory & 
Cognition, 15(3), 238-246. doi:10.3758/BF03197722 
Meyers, A., Mercatoris, M., & Artz, L. (1976). On the development of a cognitive self-monitoring skill. 
Behavior Therapy, 7(1), 128-129. doi:10.1016/S0005-7894(76)80229-8 
Middlebrooks, P. G., & Sommer, M. A. (2012). Neuronal correlates of metacognition in primate 
frontal cortex. Neuron, 75(3), 517-530. doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2012.05.028 
Metacognition in psychology 
 
51 
Mitchell, D. J., Cusack, R., & Cam, C. A. N. (2018). Visual short-term memory through the 
 lifespan: Preserved benefits of context and metacognition. Psychol Aging, 33(5), 841-
 854. doi:10.1037/pag0000265 
Morgan, G., N. Kornell, T. Kornblum and H. S. Terrace (2014). Retrospective and prospective 
metacognitive judgments in rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta). Animal Cognition 17(2): 
249-257. 
Moritz, S., Andreou, C., Schneider, B. C., Wittekind, C. E., Menon, M., Balzan, R. P., & Woodward, T. S. 
(2014). Sowing the seeds of doubt: a narrative review on metacognitive training in 
schizophrenia. Clinical Psychology Review, 34(4), 358-366. doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2014.04.004 
Moritz, S., Mahlke, C. I., Westermann, S., Ruppelt, F., Lysaker, P. H., Bock, T., & Andreou, C. (2018). 
Embracing psychosis: A cognitive insight intervention improves personal narratives and 
meaning-making in patients with schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 44(2), 307-316. 
doi:10.1093/schbul/sbx072 
Mulcahy, N. J. (2016). Orangutans (Pongo abelii) seek information about tool functionality in a 
metacognition tubes task. J Comp Psychol, 130(4), 391-399. doi:10.1037/com0000046 
Mækelæ MJ, Moritz S, Pfuhl G. (2018). Are Psychotic Experiences Related to Poorer Reflective 
Reasoning? Frontiers in Psychology.9:122 
Nelson, T. O., & Narens, L. (1990). Metamemory: A theoretical framework and some new findings. In 
G.H. Bower (Ed). The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 26, 125-173. New York: 
Academic Press 
Norman, E., & Price, M. C. (2015). Measuring consciousness with confidence ratings. In M. Overgaard 
(Ed.), Behavioural methods in consciousness research (pp. 159-180). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Normann, N., van Emmerik, A. A., & Morina, N. (2014). The efficacy of metacognitive therapy for 
anxiety and depression: a meta-analytic review. Depress Anxiety, 31(5), 402-411. 
doi:10.1002/da.22273 
Metacognition in psychology 
 
52 
Palmer, E. C., David, A. S., & Fleming, S. M. (2014). Effects of age on metacognitive efficiency. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 28, 151-160. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2014.06.007 
Panadero, E. (2017). A review of self-regulated learning: Six models and four directions for research. 
Frontiers in Psychology, 8(422), 1-28. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00422 
Panadero, E., Klug, J., & Järvelä, S. (2016). Third wave of measurement in the self-regulated learning 
field: when measurement and intervention come hand in hand AU - Panadero, Ernesto. 
Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research, 60(6), 723-735. 
doi:10.1080/00313831.2015.1066436 
Papageorgiou, C., & Wells, A. (2003). An empirical test of a clinical metacognitive model of 
rumination and depression. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 27(3), 261-273. 
doi:10.1023/a:1023962332399 
Pennequin, V., Sorel, O., & Mainguy, M. (2010). Metacognition, executive functions and 
aging: The effect of training in the use of metacognitive skills to solve mathematical 
word problems. Journal of Adult Development, 17(3), 168-176. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10804-010-9098-3   
Perdue, B. M., Evans, T. A., & Beran, M. J. (2018). Chimpanzees show some evidence of selectively 
acquiring information by using tools, making inferences, and evaluating possible outcomes. 
PLOS ONE, 13(4), e0193229. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0193229 
Perry, C. J., & Barron, A. B. (2013). Honey bees selectively avoid difficult choices. Proc Natl Acad Sci U 
S A, 110(47), 19155-19159. doi:10.1073/pnas.1314571110 
Persaud, N., Peter, M., & Alan, C. (2007). Post-decision wagering objectively measures awareness. 
Nature Neuroscience, 10(2), 257. doi:10.1038/nn1840 
Pfuhl, G., & Biegler, R. (2012). Investment in search: A nonverbal confidence judgement task. Paper 
presented at the ASAB Interdisciplinary Workshop 2012: Physical Cognition & Problem 
Solving.  
Metacognition in psychology 
 
53 
Pfuhl, G., Barrera, L. B., Living, M., & Biegler, R. (2013). Do adjustments in search behavior depend on 
the precision of spatial memory? Learn Behav, 41(1), 77-93. doi:10.3758/s13420-012-0087-1 
Pfuhl, G., Haghish, E. F., & Biegler, R. (2013). Assessment of altruism depends on inferred ulterior 
motives. Journal of Social, Evolutionary, and Cultural Psychology, 7(1), 36-50. 
doi:10.1037/h0099175 
Pfuhl, G., Sandvik, K., Biegler, R., & Tjelmeland, H. (2015). Identifying the Computational Parameters 
Gone Awry in Psychosis, International Conference on Brain Informatics and Health, 23-32 
Pfuhl, G., Tjelmeland, H., & Biegler, R. (2011). Precision and reliability in animal navigation. Bull Math 
Biol, 73(5), 951-977. doi:10.1007/s11538-010-9547-y 
Pfuhl, G., Tjelmeland, H., Molden, S., & Biegler, R. (2009). Optimal cache search depends on precision 
of spatial memory and pilfering, but what if that knowledge is not perfect? Animal Behaviour, 
78(4), 819-828. doi:10.1016/j.anbehav.2009.06.014 
Pieschl, S. (2009). Metacognitive calibration: An extended conceptualization and potential 
applications. Metacognition and Learning, 4(1), 3-31. doi:10.1007/s11409-008-9030-4 
Pintrich, P. R. (2000). The role of goal orientation in self-regulated learning. In M. Boekaerts, P. R. 
Pintrich, & M. Zeidner (Eds.), Handbook of self-regulation (pp. 451-502). San Diego, CA: 
Elsevier. 
Pintrich, P. R., Smith, D. A., Garcia, T., & McKeachie, W. J. (1993). Reliability and predictive validity of 
the Motivated Strategies for Learning Questionnaire (MSLQ). Educational and Psychological 
Measurement, 53(3), 801-813. doi:10.1177/0013164493053003024 
Pouget, A., Dayan, P., & Zemel, R. (2000). Information processing with population codes. Nature 
Reviews Neuroscience, 1, 125-132. doi:10.1038/35039062 
Reder, L. M. (1996). Different research programs on metacognition: Are the boundaries imaginary? 
Learning and Individual Differences, 8(4), 383-390. doi:10.1016/S1041-6080(96)90024-2 
Roebers, C. M. (2017). Executive function and metacognition: Towards a unifying framework of 
cognitive self-regulation. Developmental Review, 45, 31-51. doi:10.1016/j.dr.2017.04.001 
Metacognition in psychology 
 
54 
Rosenthal, D. M. (2000). Consciousness, content, and metacognitive judgments. Consciousness and 
Cognition, 9(2), 203-214. doi:10.1006/ccog.2000.0437 
Rouault, M., McWilliams, A., Allen, M. G., & Fleming, S. M. (2018). Human metacognition across 
domains: insights from individual differences and neuroimaging. Personality neuroscience, 1, 
e17. doi:10.1017/pen.2018.16 
Roussis, P., & Wells, A. (2008). Psychological factors predicting stress symptoms: metacognition, 
thought control, and varieties of worry. Anxiety Stress Coping, 21(3), 213-225. 
doi:10.1080/10615800801889600 
Sadeghi, R., Mokhber, N., Mahmoudi, L. Z., Asgharipour, N., & Seyfi, H. (2015). A systematic review 
and meta-analysis on controlled treatment trials of metacognitive therapy for anxiety 
disorders. Journal of Research in Medical Sciences, 20(9), 901-909. doi:10.4103/1735-
1995.170632 
Saed, O., Yaghubi, H., & Roshan, R. (2010). The role of meta-cognitive beliefs on substance 
dependency. Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences, 5, 1676-1680. 
doi:10.1016/j.sbspro.2010.07.344 
Salkovskis, P. M., Richards, H. C., & Forrester, E. (1995). The relationship between obsessional 
problems and intrusive thoughts. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 23(3), 281-299. 
doi:10.1017/S1352465800015885 
Schneider, W. (2008). The development of metacognitive knowledge in children and adolescents: 
Major trends and implications for education. Mind, Brain, and Education, 2(3), 114-121. 
doi:10.1111/j.1751-228X.2008.00041.x 
Schraw, G., & Dennison, R. S. (1994). Assessing metacognitive awareness. Contemporary Educational 
Psychology, 19(4), 460-475. doi:10.1006/ceps.1994.1033 
Schwartz, B. L. (1994). Sources of information in metamemory: Judgments of learning and feelings of 
knowing. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 1(3), 357-375. doi:10.3758/BF03213977 
Schwartz, B. L. (1999). Sparkling at the end of the tongue: The etiology of tip-of-the-tongue 
phenomenology. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 6(3), 379-393. doi:10.3758/BF03210827 
Metacognition in psychology 
 
55 
Seligman, M. E., & Maier, S. F. (1967). Failure to escape traumatic shock. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 74(1), 1-9. doi:10.1037/h0024514 
Semerari, A., Carcione, A., Dimaggio, G., Falcone, M., Nicolo, G., Procacci, M., & Alleva, G. (2003). 
How to evaluate metacognitive functioning in psychotherapy? The Metacognition 
Assessment Scale and its applications. Clinical Psychology & Psychotherapy, 10(4), 238-261. 
doi:10.1002/cpp.362 
Shea, N., Boldt, A., Bang, D., Yeung, N., Heyes, C., & Frith, C. D. (2014). Supra-personal cognitive 
control and metacognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 18(4), 186-193. 
doi:10.1016/j.tics.2014.01.006 
Smith, J. D. (2009). The study of animal metacognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13(9), 389-396. 
doi:10.1016/j.tics.2009.06.009 
Smith, J. D., Boomer, J., Church, B. A., Zakrzewski, A. C., Beran, M. J., & Baum, M. L. (2018). I scan, 
therefore I decline: The time course of difficulty monitoring in humans (homo sapiens) and 
macaques (macaca mulatta). J Comp Psychol, 132(2), 152-165. doi:10.1037/com0000100 
Smith, J. D., Schull, J., Strote, J., McGee, K., Egnor, R., & Erb, L. (1995). The uncertain response in the 
bottlenosed dolphin (Tursiops truncatus). Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 
124(4), 391-408. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.124.4.391 
Smith, J. D., Zakrzewski, A. C., & Church, B. A. (2016). Formal models in animal-metacognition 
research: the problem of interpreting animals' behavior. Psychon Bull Rev, 23(5), 1341-1353. 
doi:10.3758/s13423-015-0985-2 
Sodian, B., Thoermer, C., Kristen, S., & Perst, H. (2012). Metacognition in infants and young children. 
In M. J. Beran, J. L. Brandl, J. Perner, & J. Proust (Eds.), Foundations of metacognition (pp. 
119-133). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Son, L. K., & Kornell, N. (2005). Metaconfidence Judgments in Rhesus Macaques: Explicit Versus 
Implicit Mechanisms. In H. S. Terrace & J. Metcalfe (Eds.), The missing link in cognition: 
Metacognition in psychology 
 
56 
Origins of self-reflective consciousness (pp. 296-320). New York, NY, US: Oxford University 
Press 
Spada, M. M., Hiou, K., & Nikcevic, A. V. (2006). Metacognitions, emotions, and procrastination. 
Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy, 20(3), 319-326. doi:10.1891/jcop.20.3.319 
Spada, M. M., Nikcevic, A. V., Moneta, G. B., & Ireson, J. (2006). Metacognition as a mediator of the 
effect of test anxiety on a surface approach to studying. Educational Psychology, 26(5), 615-
624. doi:10.1080/01443410500390673 
Spada, M. M., Nikcevic, A. V., Moneta, G. B., & Wells, A. (2007). Metacognition as a mediator of the 
relationship between emotion and smoking dependence. Addict Behav, 32(10), 2120-2129. 
doi:10.1016/j.addbeh.2007.01.012 
Suda-King, C. (2008). Do orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) know when they do not remember? Anim 
Cogn, 11(1), 21-42. doi:10.1007/s10071-007-0082-7 
Sun, X., Zhu, C., & So, S. H. W. (2017). Dysfunctional metacognition across psychopathologies: A 
meta-analytic review. European Psychiatry, 45, 139-153. doi:10.1016/j.eurpsy.2017.05.029 
Templer, V. L., Lee, K. A., & Preston, A. J. (2017). Rats know when they remember: transfer of 
metacognitive responding across odor-based delayed match-to-sample tests. Anim Cogn, 
20(5), 891-906. doi:10.1007/s10071-017-1109-3 
Toplak, M. E., West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (2011). The Cognitive Reflection Test as a predictor of 
performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks. Memory & Cognition, 39(7), 1275. 
doi:10.3758/s13421-011-0104-1 
Veenman, M. V. J. (2011). Alternative assessment of strategy use with self-report instruments: A 
discussion. Metacognition and Learning, 6(2), 205-211. doi:10.1007/s11409-011-9080-x 
Visser, P. S., Krosnick, J. A., & Simmons, J. P. (2003). Distinguishing the cognitive and behavioral 
consequences of attitude importance and certainty: A new approach to testing the common-
factor hypothesis. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 39(2), 118-141. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-1031(02)00522-X 
Metacognition in psychology 
 
57 
Vitzthum, F. B., Veckenstedt, R., & Moritz, S. (2014). Individualized metacognitive therapy program 
for patients with psychosis (MCT+): Introduction of a novel approach for psychotic 
symptoms. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 42(1), 105-110. 
doi:10.1017/s1352465813000246 
Weinstein, C. E., Schulte, A. C., & Palmer, D. R. (1987). LASSI: Learning and study strategies inventory. 
Clearwater, FL: H & H Publishing. 
Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001). Meta-analysis of theory-of-mind development: The 
truth about false belief. Child Development, 72(3), 655-684. doi:10.1111/1467-8624.00304 
Wells, A. (2001). Emotional disorders and metacognition: Innovative cognitive therapy. Chichester: 
Wiley. 
Wells, A. (2009). Metacognitive therapy for anxiety and depression. New York: Guilford Press. 
Wells, A., & Matthews, G. (1994). Attention and emotion: A clinical perspective. Hove: Erlbaum. 
Wells, A., & Purdon, C. (1999). Metacognition and cognitive-behaviour therapy: A special issue. 
Clinical Psychology & Psychotherapy, 6(2), 71-72. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-
0879(199905)6:2<71::AID-CPP186>3.0.CO;2-G 
Whittlesea, B. W. A., & Williams, L. D. (2000). The source of feelings of familiarity: The discrepancy-
attribution hypothesis. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 26(3), 547-565. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.26.3.547 
Yonelinas, A. P. (2002). The Nature of Recollection and Familiarity: A Review of 30 Years of Research. 
Journal of Memory and Language, 46(3), 441-517. doi:10.1006/jmla.2002.2864 
Zimmerman, B. J. (2008). Investigating self-regulation and motivation: Historical background, 
methodological developments, and future prospects. American Educational Research 
Journal, 45(1), 166-183. doi:10.3102/0002831207312909 
Zimmerman, B. J., & Martinez-Pons, M. (1988). Construct validation of a strategy model of student 
self-regulated learning. Journal of Educational Psychology, 80(3), 284-290. doi:10.1037/0022-
0663.80.3.284 
Metacognition in psychology 
 
58 
Zimmerman, B. J., & Schunk, D. H. (Eds.). (2011). Handbook of self-regulation of learning and 








We thank Pia Schneider and Alain Giordanengo for help on extracting information from 
PsycInfo. We thank Audun Hetland for helpful comments. 
  














Figure 1. Number of ‘Metacognition/’ records by Classification Code in the PsycINFO 
database (searched on Ovid, February 11th, 2019).  
Figure 2. The upper graph shows the proportion of records in each subdiscipline that 
mentioned metacognition and either monitor* or control* in the title, abstract, subject 
headings or key concepts. The lower graph shows the proportion of records in each 
subdiscipline that mentioned metacognition and either knowledge, strategy*, or experience* 
in the title, abstract, subject headings or key concepts. 
 
  




Table 1. An overview of how metacognition has been addressed in each of the chosen 
subdisciplines of psychology. 
 
